“Why did the firefighters and everyone run out of water to put out the flames? Why didn’t they completely turn off the electricity and prevent sparks from fueling the firestorm?” are questions that residents of Altadena are still asking, where the Eaton Fire, which alone caused the deaths of 19 people, the destruction of more than 9,400 structures, including homes, schools and churches, and devastated more than 10,000 acres of land.
The questions come after the release of the report, “After-Action Review of the Alert Notification Systems and Evacuation Policies for the Eaton and Palisades Fires,” which devastated Southern California in January.
“The fire was coming from up there,” Hector Torres, who has lived in his Figueroa Dr. home in Altadena for 30 years, gestured with his hand toward the San Gabriel Valley mountains. “My wife, Graciela, and I had to flee at 3:30 a.m. on January 7 to my daughter’s house in Azusa.”
Torres, 67, is one of those who believe Los Angeles County authorities could have done much more to prevent thousands of homes from burning and being reduced to rubble.
“They could have stopped the fire, but they didn’t want to stop it,” he said. “Once they turned off the water, we couldn’t use the hose anymore. Why did they leave us without water? Edison, the company that didn’t maintain its power lines, was also largely to blame.”
His home suffered damage to the rear, and the financial losses total thousands of dollars. Eight months after the tragedy, he and his wife sleep in a trailer.
Outdated and Deficient Policies
The 127-page report by the McChrystal Group, a consulting firm led by retired four-star General Stanley McChrystal, concluded that a series of outdated policies, deficiencies and systemic vulnerabilities hampered the effectiveness of emergency notifications and evacuation orders during the devastating and deadly Eaton and Palisades wildfires.The report was commissioned by the Board of Supervisors.
Between January 7 and 9, six separate wildfires broke out across Southern California.
The Eaton and Palisades fires became the most destructive in County history.
Together, the two wind-driven fires, fueled by hurricane-force gusts and widespread power outages, burned approximately 37,000 acres, destroyed more than 16,000 structures, and claimed 31 lives.
The speed and magnitude of these fires tested nearly every facet of the County's emergency response system, from the suspension of aerial firefighting capabilities to its communications and electrical infrastructure.
Despite these challenges, the County's unified command, supporting local and state agencies and departments managed to contain the fires by January 31.
Errors committed
The report notes that concerns arose during and after the fires about the effectiveness of community notifications for warnings and evacuation alerts, particularly after warning messages were accidentally broadcast to thousands of Southern California residents who were not intended to receive them. Questions also arose about the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of warnings for many Altadena-area residents at the start of the Eaton Fire.
“I’m not as mad at the county as a lot of people are,” said Nicole Moore, who lost her home on Olive Street. “I heard that many fire hydrants were dry; that they had deployed most of their resources to the Palisades. I think what’s truly heartbreaking is that West Altadena wasn’t evacuated in time. And, as we know, 19 people died here.”
Contrary to residents’ testimony, the report noted that investigators found no single point of failure in the alerts, warnings, and public notifications.
“On my street, only two houses were left standing,” said Vilma Ruiz, a resident from Nicaragua who lives with her daughter on Olive Street in Altadena. “For me, I think there was a lack of preparation and response from the authorities before, during, and after the fire.”
Vilma Ruiz, 71, also called for a more efficient future response and better organization by the authorities to help those affected, saying she knows people who lost their homes and are living in their cars.
Communications Vulnerability
According to the report, a number of weaknesses, including outdated policies, inconsistent practices, and communications vulnerabilities, affected the effectiveness of the fire response system.
“These systemic issues did not manifest themselves uniformly across the two main fires. The effects of these weaknesses varied depending on environmental conditions, community preparedness, and operational complexity caused by wind variables, power outages, and fire behavior,” the study shows.
The report authors described key differences between the Palisades and Eaton fires, noting that the Palisades fire originated during the day in a community familiar with wildfire risks.
However, the Eaton fire occurred at night in an area not traditionally associated with serious wildfire risk.
“Some Altadena residents reported receiving little to no warning before the fire reached their neighborhoods,” the report states.
Beyond warning and evacuation operations, the review identified systemic issues that impacted the warning and evacuation response.
“Outdated and inconsistent policies, protocols, and standard operating procedures created ambiguity around evacuation authority and responsibilities,” the document states.
It adds that in many cases, decision-making roles were unclear, and pre-incident public communication responsibilities lacked standardization across agencies. These shortcomings contributed to a lack of uniformity in preparedness strategies across jurisdictions and slowed coordinated efforts.”
The report also cited “longstanding challenges” in training, staffing, resource management, and interagency cooperation that “further overwhelmed the response.”
“During this review, law enforcement and emergency managers reported a lack of consistency in wildfire evacuation training, highlighting the need for cross-functional exercises and clearer staffing models for surge scenarios,” the report states.
Shawn Tyrie of the McChrystal Group said the county’s Office of Emergency Management has just 37 employees in a county of 10 million people. By comparison, New York City has 200 such workers for an area smaller in both size and population.
“The issue is complex because New York is both a city and a county, and Los Angeles is a county with multiple cities, each potentially having its own emergency response personnel,” Nicole Moore said.
Recommendations for Los Angeles County
The McChrystal Group report to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors includes fixing:
They will restructure the Office of Emergency Management
Regarding priorities for action, Supervisor Lindsey Horvath told La Opinion that on Tuesday she will introduce a motion to request the Office of Emergency Management become an independent department.
“Change moves at the speed we choose. Regarding emergency preparedness, we are not waiting. We are implementing the proposed recommendations now because our communities deserve action,” Horvath said. “The After Action Report makes clear where our systems need repair, and we are committed to getting that work done.”
The supervisor said restructuring the Office of Emergency Management into a fully resourced department is a crucial first step in meeting the needs of a county of 10 million people.
“Our focus is on strengthening coordination, improving communication, and building a system that residents can rely on in times of crisis,” she said.
Clarifying Leadership Roles
Supervisor Hilda Solis (District 1), Los Angeles County Chair Pro Tempore, said the McChrystal Group report “is an important and necessary step in understanding how Los Angeles County responded and, crucially, highlights clear areas where our systems, policies, and coordination need to be strengthened.”
She emphasized that emergencies of the magnitude of the wildfires “test every level of government, and it is clear that we need to modernize our structures.” response, improve communications tools, and invest in the training and personnel necessary to support our communities.”
“Our role now is to translate these findings into meaningful action,” she specified. “This includes clarifying leadership roles during emergencies, expanding public awareness of evacuation procedures, and ensuring that all residents receive timely and accurate alerts, regardless of where they live.”
“We are not immune to disasters.”
For her part, Supervisor Kathryn Barger acknowledged that the challenges and failures highlighted in the McChrystal report are important “because, taken together, the improvements will lead to a systemic change in how Los Angeles County warns and evacuates communities during complex emergencies like the Eaton Fire.”
Barger emphasized that it is her goal for each of the recommendations to be addressed and implemented.
He added that the lesson he learned from the devastating Eaton and Palisades fires was that Los Angeles County is not immune to catastrophic disasters.
“The devastation caused by the Eaton Fire, driven by hurricane-strength winds, as documented in the report, was unimaginable and a stark reminder of our region’s vulnerability,” he stated, urging residents to remain vigilant and always take threats seriously, whether wildfires, earthquakes, or other disasters. “We live in a new era where preparedness, alertness, and awareness are essential,” he emphasized.
“My message to the residents of Los Angeles County is clear: I am committed to ensuring the recommendations and improvements outlined in this report are implemented. Los Angeles County will work tirelessly to be ready for the next catastrophe. The safety of our residents will always be my top priority,” he concluded.
