If the question of what will happen in Venezuela has always been complex, now, with the involvement of the United States, it is much more so.

What happens in Venezuela after the capture of Nicolas Maduro on January 3 will not only depend on the realignment of Chavista forces, but also on US domestic politics and the campaign Donald Trump's expansionist policies and the geopolitical movements of actors like Russia and China.

“This experiment in intervention in Venezuela is unprecedented. It learns from previous experiences and, as such, depends on many variables that could lead to total failure, not necessarily due to internal Venezuelan dynamics, but rather to a series of considerations that affect Venezuela but transcend it,” says Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, a veteran of international relations and vice-rector of the Torcuato Di Tella University in Buenos Aires.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted on Wednesday at a three-phase plan to stabilize, recover, and eventually bring about a democratic transition in the country.

On Thursday, in a show of cooperation and detente, the Chavista government announced—and it was later confirmed—the release of “a significant number” of Venezuelan and foreign prisoners. High-profile politicians like Enrique Marquez and renowned activists like Rocio San Miguel were released from prison.

Even so, the scenarios are numerous. Nothing allows us to rule out, for example, further attacks from the US, some kind of response from Venezuela, an internal coup, or intervention by another country.

But perhaps more than specific scenarios, which in any case will be fragile and intertwined, with the available information it is possible to look to the future under three possibilities: continuity, a worsening of the situation, and a path toward democratic transition in Venezuela. Let's see.

1.The status quo remains.

Even if Chavismo shows conciliatory signs like the one announced on Thursday, it is possible, as has already happened, that everything will soon return to the beginning: people are arrested, those considered adversaries are persecuted, the power structures remain under their control, the economy stagnates and is besieged, and the well-being of the majority of Venezuelans, who suffer from soaring prices and meager wages, continues to stagnate.

In the last 5 years, the term “catastrophic stalemate” has been used to describe this situation: nobody wins, nobody loses, and Chavismo maintains its grip, stretching the laws and deepening repression.

But this time it is different: the involvement of the world's greatest power is an unprecedented and significant factor.

“It is almost certain that Venezuela at the end of the year will be very different from how it is today,” says James Bosworth, author of the newsletter Latin America Risk Report, where he frequently She takes stock of the scenarios.

“Reality includes the geopolitical landscape, the very geology of the oil fields, and the logistical chain for extracting as much oil as possible; that is, one possibility is that when everything seems to be going well, it will all fall apart, or that there will be one outcome in Caracas, another in Maracaibo, where the oil is, and another in Bolivar, where the ELN (a Colombian guerrilla group) has strengthened. The clearest scenario is one of extreme chaos.”

In the five days after Maduro's capture, the Chavista leadership's continued hold on power under Delcy Rodriguez, the ongoing repression in the streets, and Trump's dismissal of opposition leader Maria Corina Machado as a transition leader suggested that, at least in the short term, “a transition without a transition” is the most likely scenario, according to Carolina Jimenez Sandoval, president of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

“When “You think about the nature of the two poles with the greatest capacity to effect change in Venezuela (Chavismo and the U.S.), and you don't feel that either of them has, as part of its nature, a vocation for democratic change,” the Venezuelan expert asserts.

According to Jimenez Sandoval, Trump doesn't seem influenced by an interest in regime change, but rather driven exclusively by oil and the expansion of his sphere of influence.

2. The situation in Venezuela is worsening

That's why, for experts, it's impossible to rule out that the situation in Venezuela will worsen, even starting from the premise that the economic, political, and social status quo has been—for years—grave.

But now with the participation of the world's greatest power.

There's talk of the intervention in Panama in 1989, where Washington overthrew Manuel Noriega,He dissolved the army and helped Guillermo Endara, considered by many to be a “puppet,” to come to power.

Venezuela is a far more complex and larger country than Panama.

That is why some consider Iraq, in the Middle East, to be a more similar case. In 2003, a US-led ground invasion removed the ruling elite from power but fueled a civil war between sectarian armed groups, including the Islamic State, which displaced millions and had consequences that continue to this day for the entire region.

Although the religious component is not part of the Venezuelan context, there are armed groups within its territory that identify as Chavistas, including the army. These groups may carry out attacks based on what they perceive as an “imperialist occupation” endorsed by a ruling elite that, they might argue, betrayed Chavez's legacy.

The complexity of violence in Venezuela today is so as large as that of its neighbor Colombia, the country of 60 years of still unresolved armed conflict.

The ELN, an anti-imperialist Colombian guerrilla group, is now in Venezuela. Many say it is, in a way, Venezuelan. Its closeness to Chavismo—which that movement denies—has empowered the armed group in recent years. Half of its fighters—some 2,000, according to specialized studies—are in Venezuela.

The presence of other international armed groups, such as Hezbollah, has also been mentioned, although with less evidence than for the ELN. In a worst-case scenario, their presence may be more than just speculation.

The deepening of the violence could, once again, encourage the emigration of Venezuelans, generating a new humanitarian crisis like the one that, in recent years, has shocked Latin America and the United States. Eight million have left: one of the worst diasporas in modern history.

And then there's the economic component: if US mediation is limited to oil exploitation, and the Chavista government fails to lower inflation, increase investment, and create formal jobs, the lives of Venezuelans could worsen.

“The minimum wage is now less than US$1, but we haven't considered the possibility that, due to devaluation and inflation, it could literally reach 0, or a negative number, meaning that when people earn money, they actually have to pay to receive it,” says Sandoval.

Employment has been deteriorating in Venezuela for a decade, but a worse situation could paradoxically make working less beneficial than not working.

In Venezuela, as has been repeated for years, things can always get worse.

3. Towards a transition

Having said all this, the Trump and Rubio plan cannot be ruled out:that Maduro's capture unlocks the transition and creates incentives within the Chavista elite to fulfill agreements.

This could translate, first, into the elimination of extrajudicial detentions and repression.

Then, the government would have to create spaces for the opposition—which proved to have won the 2024 presidential elections—to gain influence in the design of public policies.

As the credibility of Chavismo is tested, foreign interest—or interest from Venezuelans abroad—is likely to emerge to invest and create formal jobs.

If all this happens, the community associations that have grown so much in recent years could consolidate, receive international funding, and support the State in addressing the most basic needs: services, food, health, and education.