Iran's leaders are trying to present the developing memorandum of understanding with the United States not as a withdrawal, but as the result of resistance and victory.

This is, however, not an easy argument to sustain.

The country has just gone through a devastating war, its economy is under severe pressure and sectors of the Islamic Republic's own support base have been denouncing any type of agreement with Washington for months.

There are also Iranians both inside and outside the country who see the crisis not as a moment for diplomacy, but as an opportunity for regime change.

This is the divided political landscape in which Tehran is now trying to sell the deal.

The Tehran narrative

Senior Iranian officials have presented the pact as a victory.

Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, speaker of parliament and Iran's key figure in the negotiations, said the country has taken "a big step towards final victory."

President Masoud Pezeshkian has called the understanding potentially transformative and noted that, if fully implemented, it could solve many of Iran's problems and create “a different world” both in the country and in the Middle East.

Qalibaf's role is significant because he is not identified with the moderate Pezeshkian sector.

His public backing suggests the deal has support from more powerful sectors of the establishment, including within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The leadership also presents the agreement as a victory because, according to Tehran's argument, the United States and Israel did not achieve their main objectives.

They did not force Iran to surrender, they did not overthrow the Islamic Republic, they did not end Iran's nuclear program through military action or sever Iran's ties with Hezbollah.

On the contrary, Iran remains at the negotiating table with Lebanon included in the framework of the agreement, as well as the relief of sanctions.

However, this official narrative is met with opposition within Iran.

Internal criticism

One hardline MP – vice-chairman of Parliament's National Security Committee – reportedly described the draft agreement as a document that would turn Iran into a US colony.

He also accused negotiators of ignoring the supreme leader's directive not to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping.

This criticism is relevant because it does not come from outside the system, but from within one of the institutions in charge of supervising national security.

For months, hardline voices in Parliament, pro-state media and nightly pro-government rallies have argued that the United States cannot be trusted.

They note that diplomacy was still ongoing shortly before the war began and claim that the Trump administration used the negotiations as cover while Israel and the United States prepared military action.

For them, any agreement with Washington risks looking like a policy of appeasement.

However, some of these voices seem to have moderated now.

This could suggest that the decision to move forward has been authorized from the highest levels of the State.

However, this does not mean that there is total unity.

It could indicate that, for the moment, the center of power has considered that the cost of rejecting an agreement could be greater than that of facing the opposition of the most intransigent sectors.

The economic factor

Iran's leaders are likely to present the deal as the result of its military influence, including pressure around the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on US and regional energy interests.

However, the economic situation has also forced Tehran to act.

War, sanctions, restrictions on shipping, limited access to oil markets and hard currencies, as well as very high inflation, have suffocated both the country and ordinary Iranians.

For many families, the question is not whether the agreement sounds like a victory, but whether it will lower prices and reduce fears of a new war.

US Vice President JD Vance has stated that Iran would not receive taxpayer money, but could access billions of dollars if it meets its commitments and sanctions are eased.

This allows Tehran to present the agreement as a path towards investment and reconstruction, rather than as a dependence on the United States.

However, the risks are evident: all the details of the memorandum have not yet been published and negotiations are scheduled to begin this Friday in Switzerland.

The most complex issues remain to be addressed in the talks: the future of Iran's enriched uranium, the level of enrichment allowed, verification mechanisms, sanctions relief and the situation in Hormuz and Lebanon.

There is also uncertainty regarding Israel.

Its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has rejected information that points to an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, ensuring that Israeli forces will remain there as long as necessary.

For his part, Donald Trump has publicly criticized Israel's actions in Lebanon, pointing out that too many people have died.

He also expressed displeasure over an Israeli attack on Beirut shortly before the Iran-US deal was reached, although he insisted that his relationship with Netanyahu remains excellent.

For Tehran, this visible friction between Washington and Israel is useful.

It can be presented as evidence that Iranian pressure has limited Israel's freedom of action.

However, it also makes the agreement fragile.

If Israel continues its operations in Lebanon, Iran will be pressured to respond.

And, if Washington fails to contain Israel, Tehran's claim that Lebanon is included in the memorandum could quickly be tested.

The opinion of Iranians

The reaction of the BBC Persian Service audience suggests that the official narrative of victory is not catching on uniformly.

One follower commented that he was very concerned about a new Israeli attack, but that, even after learning about the agreement, he did not feel “any confidence” and was concerned about whether the country would be managed properly if the pact stood.

Another Iranian opponent of the regime, who initially supported the US military action, questioned the achievements of the US attack, saying: “Our hope was that the ruling system would change, but apart from misery, inflation and further damage to the economy, what benefit has it brought to the people?”

Others were more sympathetic to the government's position.

One member of the public described Iran as the victor and claimed that the war showed that sanctions are not lifted by “begging,” but by the exercise of power.

Another person welcomed the agreement more cautiously, commenting that it allowed people to return to work and their daily lives with greater peace of mind.

“I think it's temporary,” he said, “but we needed a few months of respite and calm.”

Perhaps that is the most realistic interpretation: the Islamic Republic presents the agreement as a victory because it is difficult to sell it as a necessity.

For many Iranians, however, success will not be measured in slogans.

It will be measured by whether the war stops, whether prices moderate, whether sanctions relief comes, and whether leaders manage to manage the next phase without another sudden escalation.