Since 1995, the share of global wealth owned by billionaires has increased from 1% to more than 3%.

That is one of the data that many people have seen as confirmation that the perception that the economic system disproportionately benefits a small elite has ceased to be a mirage in recent years and has given way to reality.

And with the realization that the number of wealthy people has increased at a dizzying rate in recent decades, it seems that a bitter aftertaste has spread among citizens that awakens a desire for revenge.

That is why the writer and journalist Andrea Rizzi believes that we have entered “The Age of Revenge”, as his latest book is titled.

“The elites have been driven by predatory impulses, with an unbridled greed that is part of human instincts, as Dante and other authors described many centuries ago”, he explains in conversation with BBC Mundo.

Globalization, which arrived full of promise, ended up displacing traditional jobs and concentrating profits in specific sectors, creating very visible winners and losers.

In his book, Rizzi describes a global scenario in which resentment and revenge are driving forces.

“Citizens who feel marginalized by globalization and who have lost mediating institutions—such as political parties or unions—find themselves exposed to toxic currents of political forces that don’t really defend their interests and that are sucking democratic and human rights values ??into the abyss,” he points out.

And although this is happening globally, Latin America, with its extreme pendulum swings, is the barometer of constant dissatisfaction, the expert believes.

BBC Mundo spoke with Andrea Rizzi at the HAY Festival Queretaro, which takes place from September 4 to 7 in that city in Mexico.

Your latest book is titled “The Age of Revenge.”Is the age of revenge a time of hate?

Above all, it is a time of resentment that generates a desire for revenge and that in some cases can have streaks of hatred.

Resentment for abuses committed in different areas of life.

On the one hand, there is a resentment generated by the dominance of the United States and its allies, which have shaped the world order as we know it and which in some cases has generated abuses. And, then, there is resentment from countries that want a correction of that world order established after the Second World War.

And then, I think there is another great resentment, which comes from the working classes, from a large part of Western societies. A rejection of a system in which certain segments of society have been able to prosper, riding the wave of globalization and new technologies, while they have been, in a way, forgotten.

In your book, you quote economist Branko Milanovic, who claims that global inequality is at its lowest point in more than 100 years; however, there is palpable discontent among the working classes, who find themselves in precarious situations while the elites benefit enormously. Isn't there a contradiction between the figures and the sentiment?

In reality, they are two distinct and perfectly compatible dynamics.

What Milanovic observes is that there has been a reduction in inequality on a global scale. This means that there are countries that have made a leap forward, especially China.

But this is not contradictory to the fact that within some societies, especially Western ones, there is a problem of inequality that fuels discontent and frustration.

These are two dynamics that run parallel without being contradictory.

What elements define the “frustration bomb” of the middle classes?

I like to define them as the popular classes or working class in English. Because the middle classes, in my opinion, were divided between an upper middle class - which has known how to adapt to the globalized world and take advantage of its opportunities - and another that, on the other hand, has been sliding downwards.

What is the basis of this malaise among the working classes?

After the Second World War, a strong expectation of progress was generated in Western Europe, and in Latin America too of course, that made people think that the road ahead could have potholes, but that it was a path that in all likelihood guaranteed improvements for future generations.

These expectations were shattered especially from 2008 onwards and again after the pandemic.

The second feature of the malaise, I believe, has to do with the volatility and precariousness of our time with the relocation of jobs, the comings and goings of investment flows or,For example, in Latin America, the fluctuations in raw material prices.

If we add to this the absence of solid regulations and connective and protective fabrics, there is another vein of discomfort.

And we cannot forget that thanks to the internet and social networks, the popular classes have extreme visibility over the lives of the elites, which generates yearnings, desires, and frustrations.

With which, I believe that there are material elements and other cultural and psychological ones.

What does all this cause? What does this translate into in modern societies?

All of these elements we've talked about have formed a resentment bomb that produces tremendous political turbulence and results in support for populist, extremist forces of one persuasion or another, although tending to be mainly far-right and nationalist.

It's a revolt against the system that takes shape in support for leaders, movements, or political groups that present themselves as proposals to challenge the system.

Another derivative of this malaise is a certain retrograde mechanism in the cultural sphere, which adds to and goes hand in hand with the mechanism that pushes populist forces.

Billionaire Warren Buffett said: "There is a class war, yes. But it's my class, the rich, who is waging it, and we are winning." This phrase seems to suggest that the rich are fighting the battle while the less wealthy classes are sitting idly by, have lost class consciousness, and have become demobilized. Is that so? How did this happen?

I believe that the elites have been driven by predatory impulses, with an unbridled greed that is part of human instincts, as Dante and other authors described many centuries ago.

In this new reality, the instruments that facilitated mechanisms of resistance of the working classes, such as unions, for example, have been weakened.

And, at the same time, it has happened that some formations that traditionally defended the interests of the working classes have been modifying their postulates and instead of continuing to contain the greed of capitalism, they have instead embraced policies of mere redistribution of the wealth produced by capitalism.

But this did not end up working completely; this was very evident with social democracy in Europe, and this has generated a distrust towards them.

And, therefore, citizens who could trust this proposal of social protection no longer believe it. And then they look for more extreme responses.

We have also seen this in many parts of Latin America…

Yes, it is evident in the region.

And there have been huge swings in votes, in some cases,with segments of the working classes that, theoretically, should be better protected with progressive or moderate leaderships, and who, however, have opted for other realities, for extreme, nationalist or hyperliberal proposals, as is the case in Argentina.

I am remembering the social outbreak in Chile that began in 2019, the 2020 rebellion in Guatemala over the budget law that reduced funds for health and education, the violent protests in Ecuador or Panama in 2022 and 2023, the recent demonstrations in Argentina. Is Latin America experiencing a time of rebellion?

I believe we are seeing strong outbreaks of it; spasms of frustration that are congealing into street protests with different motivations.

They are symptoms of a dissatisfaction that has to do with a common phenomenon in Latin America, although it cannot be generalized: governments have not managed to provide citizens with efficient services and security.